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NOTES
Eminent Domain: Corduroy Road to
Ohio's Super Highways
Is Ohio bogged down with an antiquated method of obtaining prop-
erty?
Signs along Ohio's highway which read: "Begin Construction Area
- Ohio Department of Highways" are daily increasing in number. The
steady influx of industry with a correlative increase of population has
necessitated an increase of highway facilities. Added impetus to this
expansion program is being afforded by the Federal Aid for Highways
program in which Ohio is participating.' Whether the pattern for long
range highway development finds realization in the widening of an exist-
ing road or calls for the establishment of a completely new location, the
acquisition of real property is generally required to provide a sufficient
right-of-way. Such acquisitions may be completed by simple negotia-
'See American Bar Association, AfuniciPal Law Service Letter p. 1 (October 1957).
'"The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 made available for highway construction,
in cooperation with the State Highway departments, the sum of 34 billion dollars to
be expended in the next 13 years. Of that sum, it is expected that approximately
5 billion dollars will be needed for the purchase of right-of-way for highways 2lone.
It has been estimated that approximately 15 billion dollars would be needed for
highway right-of-way to bring all roads and streets up to tolerable standards of ade-
quacy. Even though but a small percentage of the land acquired will have to be
condemned, the number of condemnation cases will be greatly increased."
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tion with the property owner, or through the assistance of judicial pro-
ceedings - either method has its attendant problems.
Discussion with jurists, attorneys, and real estate agents representing
both the state and private owners has revealed the existence of two major
interrelated problems: First, the public reaction to the new evaluation-
negotiation procedure effective July 31, 1958, and second, what will be
the court's ruling as to an apparent inconsistency regarding the "view
of the premises" found in sections 5519.02 and 5519.03 of the Ohio
Revised Code. The scope of this note will be a presentation of these
two topics and a submission of proposals for future procedural legisla-
tion which emanate from the discussion.
THE EMINENT DOMAIN CONCEPT
The right of the sovereign to acquire property for public use upon
making just compensation is known as the right of eminent domain. It
is the superior right of property subsisting in a sovereignty, -by which
private property may be taken or its use controlled for the public benefit,
without regard to -the wishes of the owner.2 This power of eminent
domain - like the power of taxation and the police power - belongs
to the state as a sovereign. These three powers have been referred to as
the "state's power plant."3 The existence of these powers is independ-
ent of the Constitution, but the Constitution, recognizing their existence,
has limited and regulated their exercise by the state.i Within this con-
stitutional 'boundary the right of eminent domain lies dormant in the
state until legislative action calls it forth. The right may then be exer-
cised by the state itself or may be delegated to a corporation or individual
'to whom has been delegated some public duty or function. In either
event, the legislature prescribe such regulations as it deems necessary to
protect the interests of the people. To assure this result, the power may
only be exercised in strict compliance with the manner prescribed.5 Al-
though condemnation proceedings are judicial proceedings, within the
20O REV. CODE c. 2709 (Definition).
'New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 341, 1 N.E.2d 153,
155 (1936).
'People ex rel. Burhans v. City of New York, 198 N.Y. 439, 446, 92 N.E. 18, 20
(1910) and Matter of City of New York, 190 N.Y. 350, 354, 83 N.E. 299, 300
(1907) "The legislature may require the donee of the right to do more than is
demanded by the constitution, but it may not permit less to be done."; People v.
Adirondack Ry. Co., 169 N.Y. 225, 237-38, 54 N.E. 689, 692 (1899), af'd, 176
U.S. 335 (1900) "Within those boundaries the state, acting through the depart-
ment which exercises the legislative power, may proceed at will, and the extent,
method and necessity of exercising the power to take private property for public use
may not be interferred with by other departments of government."
'United States v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261 (1949)
[September
NOTES
scope of this statutorily controlled power6 the Ohio Department of High-
ways determines its own policy, and thus the negotiation proceedings are
administrative in actual practice. If the property owner is satisfied with
the award determined by the department appraisal, the condemnor may
have no need to resort to the courts. If the condemnee interposes objec-
tions as to what the department has regarded as a fair value of the prop-
erty taken, the proceedings are thereafter entirely judicial in scope and
character, and are mn rem -binding on all persons having any interest in
the property takenY
It is obvious that these preliminary negotiations may have an im-
portant effect on the number of cases entering the courts for an ulti-
mate determination of what is "just compensation."
NEGOTIATION WITH THE PROPERTY OWNER
Understanding the meaning of "just compensation" is an important
prelude to a study of the department's negotiation procedure. "Just
compensation" is an assurance guaranteed under the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution8 as a restriction on the federal courts.
Under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, the
federal government guarantees that no state shall deprive an individual of
his life, liberty or property without due process of law.9 Practically every
state in the Union contains an express constitutional prohibition against
the taking of private property for public use without compensation.' 0
Compensation implies remuneration, payment in money, indemnification
for a loss, but to whom does the "just" refer - to the condemnor, the
owner, or both? The courts refer to "just compensation" as a full in-
demnity" for the loss sustained by the owner of the property taken for
the public use, or the full equivalent to place the owner in as good a
condition pecuniarily as he would have been if the property had not been
taken. Actually when the courts refer to "just compensation" they mean
fatr market value, which is generally defined as the price which a willing
buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are free to act and are under
6 §§ 5519.01-.05 (1957).
" Sowers v. Schaeffer, 152 Ohio St. 65, 87 N.E.2d 257 (1949).
B "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without lust compensatfon."
(Emphasis added).
'Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573 (1898).
"
0North Carolina, which is the only state without such an express constitutional
guarantee, recognized this fundamental right to just compensation as founded on
natural justice in City of Raleigh v. Hatcher, 220 N.C. 613, 18 S.E.2d 207 (1942).
'Kane v. Chicago, 392 Ill. 172, 64 N.E.2d 506 (1946); Matter of City of New
York (Waterfront), 190 N.Y. 350, 83 N.E. 299 (1907).
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no compulsion, would agree upon. Obviously the definition raises more
questions than it answers,12 and, like any rule, is easy to state but often
difficult to apply. In Grant v. Hyde Park'3 the Ohio Supreme Court
recognized that there can be two elements to be considered in valuation
of the property. First, value of the property actually taken, and second,
damage to the residue. Armed with the fair market value definition and
the rule in the Grant case the Department of Highways must proceed
with the negotiations.
There are infirmities in referring to "just compensation" as a full in-
demnity. In arriving at a value, money is considered an inflexible com-
modity; the actual change in value of the currency is not considered. The
owner's expenses incurred in the litigation, his expert witness' fees, as
well as compensation to his attorney are not part of the just compensa-
tion and must be borne by the ousted owner himself. Also, what a
property will bring in a fair and open market is a mere matter of opinion
until a sale has actually been consummated.
Until July 31, 1957, the policy of the Highway Department had been
to have the required property appraised by one of their staff appraisers
and then approach the property owner making an overture of purchase
based on this figure. Possibly the negotiator for the state would make
his first offer slightly lower than the appraised figure to allow for flexi-
bility in bargaining. If the two parties could not reach an agreement
on this figure, the property would be reappraised - this time by inde-
pendent appraisers who might be local real estate men, but definitely
individuals known to be well versed in property values in the area. On
the basis of this new valuation which might be the same, larger, or
smaller, the property owner would again be approached. If the new
figure equalled, or was smaller, the owner would once again be asked to
accept the first offer, and if again rejected, appropriation proceedings
would be commenced. If the new appraisal was for a larger figure, the
owner would be approached on this basis. This bargaining might reach
a satisfactory conclusion by sale, or another stalemate. Possibly the
owner's attorney might enter the scene, and, by pointing out facets of
valuation that could be entered in evidence should a judicial interven-
'Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 390, 5 S.W 792, 794
(1887) "Of course, real estate is not like cotton, grain, and other commercial
products. It cannot be sold upon an hour s notice. To sell land at its market value
sometimes requires effort and negotiation for some weeks or even some months.";
Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 81 N.E. 970 (1907); Matter of Board of
Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 457, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938) "Fair market value
means neither panic value, auction value, speculative value, nor value fixed by de-
pressed or inflated prices. The mere absence of competitive buyers does not es-
tablish lack of a real marker."
"i67 Ohio St. 166, 65 N.E. 891 (1902).
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tion become necessary, sufficiently increase the state's offer to satisfy
the owner's monetary desire. If not, appropriation proceedings would
be commenced.
In a letter dated July 31, 1957, from Harold H. Waddel, Ohio's Chief
of Right-of-Way, to All Division Engineers, a new procedure was out-
lined. With undertones which may be construed as aiding the Casper
Milktoasts of Ohio; s.e., establishing uniformity as to the number of ap-
praisals prior to any negotiation, the policy was set forth requiring the
Department of Highways to see that
the appraisals upon which negotiations are based must be made by the
same appraisers who will be witnesses if the property is appropriated and
an appeal is taken ,and all appraisals must be made in full and com-
plete detail.
The methods used in two special situations will not be included because
of the limited nature of their application. First, when the property cost
will be less than $1,000 and there is little likelihood that the owners will
contest, and, second, when large commercial or industrial properties
adaptable only to a unique or special use are involved. Appraisals of
the majority of parcels
shall be made by no less than two independent appraisers in addition
to the Staff appraiser. These appraisals shall be entirely independent of
each other. If there is a major difference, additional independent apprai-
sals shall be obtained until positive, consistent and logical opinions are
available. All of the appraisals shall be reviewed by the Reviewing Ap-
praiser and submitted by him to the Central Office with his comments
and recommendatons, for review and approval.
In each case, the Reviewing Appraiser shall make a physical inspection
of the property and obtain sufficient data so that at a later date, if required,
he will be able to prepare an appraisal report to testify in court proceedings.
In the dosing paragraph Mr. Waddel summarizes that the new pro-
cedure
will require considerable extra work in connection with the appraisal
of the properties to be acquired. However, it is believed that the overall
acquisition program can be more effectively and efficiently accomplished
if our initial groundwork is well laid.
The day of the "horse-trading" right-of-way purchaser is gone, and in
his stead we must place the diplomat. In effect, the purchaser has be-
come the seller-he must sell the property owner on the department's
appraised value and impart as tactfully as possible that this is a final offer.
This new method seems to impose a Herculean task of super-salesmanship
on the Highway Department. A slight misunderstanding by the property
owner as to the operation and reason for the new system can easily result
in his feeling that the offer is arbitrary and certainly not "what his lawyer
can get." How does this affect the legal profession? The "office" at-
1958]
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torney, who under the former system, could generally negotiate an in-
crease after the Department's single appraisal is going to be put on his
mettle to find a valuation facet overlooked by the three independent ap-
praisers to obtain even a nominal increase with which to appease his
client. The finality with which this offer is made will make no sub-
stantial difference to the mental attitude of the "trial" attorney. In fact,
his practice will most likely increase with the insurge to his office of his
brother "office" attorney's clients. The corresponding increase to the
already overcrowded court docket is an effect important to the entire
profession.
These are some of the problems created by valuation procedures
prior to the judicial appropriation. A study of the pertinent judicial
procedure may disclose a method of curing the ills existing in both areas
in "one fell swoop."
APPROPRIATING THE PROPERTY
Does the statutory provision in Ohio that a view of the premises by
the jury shall be avaliable on motion of either party, in appropriation pro-
ceedings, prohibit the removal of any structure from the land prior
this view? The Ohio courts have not yet been required to answer this
question under the most recent legislative enactment, and there seems
to be some doubt as to what decision they will reach.
Until the Ohio Court of Appeals decided In re Appropriatton for
Highway Purposes,'4 a reading of the chapter on Appropriation of Prop-
erty in the Ohio Revised Code' 5 prior to these amendments would have
led one to believe that although a separate finding of value of the land
and the structures thereon would be required,'8 still the Director of High-
ways had the immediate right of entry on the property after determining
its value, making the appropriate entry in the journal of the Depart-
ment of Highways,' 7 and depositing the appraised sum with the court.
The Ohio Court of Appeals, however, did not so construe these sections,
"'90 Ohio App. 471, 107 N.E.2d 387 (1951).
15 § 5519.01-.05 (1953)
"OHIo REV. CODE § 5519.03 (1953).
17 OHIO REv. CODE § 5519.01 (1953) "If the director of highways is unable to pur-
chase property he shall first enter on the journal of the department of high-
ways a finding that it is necessary, for the public convenience and welfare, to ap-
propriate such property as he deems needed for such purposes. Such finding shall
contain ,and thereupon the director may take possessson of and enter upon sasd
property. " (Emphasis added); OHIO REV. CODE § 5519.03 (1953) " [Tjitle
to said structure shall vest in the state with the right to enter upon the site of said
structure and adjoining land upon which it is located for the purpose of removing
the structure therefrom."
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but held that because a separate assessment by the jury of the values of
the land and buildings respectively was required, t.e., trial and view of
the premises by jury, "the vesting of tide to such structures is stayed and
the right of entry is prohibited" until such evaluation has been made by
the jury.18 Without doubt, the effect of this ruling could easily deter
the completion of a proposed highway project since it is doubtful that
any private contractor would begin work until the state had certified
that the right-of-way was clear, and that his entry thereon would not
subject hun to personal liability from an unpad and contesting property
owner. To alleviate the probability of such delay, the Ohio legislature
amended the pertinent sections' 9 to grant the director power to take
possession immediately upon depositing the appraised value in court,
with the limitation that without the owner's or occupanes consent the
director may not take possession of any structure prior to the expiration
of sixty days from the service of notice.20
These amendments would seem to preclude any future statutory ob-
jection to removal or destruction prior to the view -by the jury, but the
operation of section 5519.02 of the Ohio Revised Code2 ' pertaining to
'It; re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 90 Ohio App. 471, 477,
107 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1951).
1Omio REv. CODE § 5519.01 (1957). The immediate right to take possession and
enter property was amended so that "property" was replaced by "buildings and
structures thereon."; OHfo REV. CODE § 5519.03 (1957) was amended by adding:
'The owner or occupant of such structure shall vacate the same within sixty days
after service of notice as required under the provisions of section 5519.01 of the
Revised Code, after which time the director may remove said structures. In the
event such structures are removed before the jury has fixed the value of the same,
the director, before such removal, shall cause an appraisal to be made by three per-
sons, one to be appointed by the owner, one by the county auditor, and one by the
director, and such appraisal may be used as evidence by the owner or director in the
trial of said case but shall not be binding on said owner, director or the jury, and
the expense of said appraisal shall be approved by the court and charged as costs in
said case; shall cause pictures to be taken of all sides of said structure; and shall
compile a complete description of said structure, which he shall preserve as evidence
in said case to which the owner or occupants shall have access."
wSee Duffy, Condemnation of Structures, 16 Ouo ST. LJ. 462 (1955), for a dis-
cussion of this and other problems which may arise in litigation involving these
amendments.
"Upon the motion of either party, the jury, under the care of an officer of the
court and with such person as the court designates to show them the premises, shall
examine the property taken and the property of the several appellants claimed to be
damaged thereby. Such examination shall be before any testimony is submitted, ex-
cept the plat and a survey of the property taken and the title papers of the appellant,
if produced, which the jury may take with them. After making such examination,
the jury shall return to the court at the time fixed therefor. After the jury has re-
turned to the court the parties shall offer their evidence to the jury under the direc-
tion of the court in accordance with the rules af law and procedure governing cases
in the court of common pleas."
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view raises some further questions which the courts have not as yet
answered. The language of this latter section, allowing a view upon the
motion of either party, is mandatory in tenor, but the purpose of the
view may aid in determining what interpretation the courts will allow.
Is the view itself to have the efficacy of evidence, or is it merely to en-
able the jury to follow the evidence presented with greater ease? If
the former, the court could readily hold the amendment to section
5519.03 of the Ohio Revised Code as ineffectual in accomplishing a
ready means of possession for the highway department. If the latter, the
Ohio courts might allow the effect of the amendment. Both conclu-
sions have their followers.
The opinion of those courts that feel the view should be evidence is
epitomized by the decision in Washburn v. Milwaukee & L.W R. Co.22
where it was said:
What they see they know absolutely.
This postulate has been held to include the situation where the jury
must determine value - a matter of opinion as distinguished from a
fact in existence. 23
Those courts which feel that the view is solely to enable the jury to
more clearly understand and apply the evidence adduce in support of
their conclusion that it would be impossible to determine how much
weight was due to the inspection as contrasted with the opposing evi-
dence. This would result in the cause being determined, not upon the
evidence given in open court, to be discussed by counsel and considered
by the court in deciding a motion for new trial, but upon the opinion of
jurors - silent witnesses in the case, burdened with testimony un-
known to both parties in respect to which no opportunity for examina-
tion or correction of error, if any, could be afforded either party. These
courts generally conclude that a jury must base their verdict on evidence
delivered to them in open court, and that they may not take into con-
'59 Wis. 364, 368-69, 18 N.W 328, 330 (1884). The court limited the function
of the jury somewhat by charging that they could not disregard the testimony pre-
sented in court, but in its opinion the court stated that "if a witness testified that a
certain farm is hilly and rugged, when the view has disclosed to the jury, and every
juror alike, that it is level and smooth, or if a witness testify that a given building
was burned before the view, and the view discloses that it had not been burned-
no contrary evidence of witnesses on the stand is required to authorize the jury to
find the fact as is, in disregarding the testimony given in court."
' 32 Mass. 198 (15 Pick. 1834). It is interesting to note that in his charge the
judge said: " Ilf any one of them (jurors) knew any fact, from their own
knowledge, which bore upon the case, he ought to disclose it and testify to it in
court."; Kiernan v. Chicago, Santa Fe and California Ry. Co., 123 Ill. 188, 14 N.E.
18 (1887). In this case the jury was allowed to weigh the evidence presented
against their opinion as to the value of the property.
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sideration facts known to them personally, but outside of the evidence
produced before them in court. If then, a party would avail himself of
the facts known to a juror, he must have him sworn and examined, as
other witnesses.2 4
The Ohio Supreme Court was called upon to decide this question
when it was argued that the bill of exceptions to a reviewing court would
not contain a complete record if the "evidence" garnered by the view was
absent therefrom and that therefore the court could not review the ques-
tion of weight of the evidence. In holding that the bill of exceptions
did present a complete record, the Ohio court decided that the impres-
sions made on the minds of the jurors in an appropriation case by a view
of the premises are not of themselves evidence in the cause.25 The court
reasoned that it is utterly improbable that the legislature could have
established such elaborate details for a full trial, and in its stead have
only a partial trial before the court of record and have the remainder
away from the presence of the judge - perhaps a dozen miles in the
country; that after setting forth details for preservation of a bill of ex-
ceptions, for review and error, the weight of the evidence given to sup-
port alleged facts is inaccessible.
But, is it possible for the jury, even on the most lucid instructions,
to resolutely forget the impressions acquired during the view and their
own knowledge of the value of land in that vicinity? To do otherwise
has been held to be erroneous.26 Does it not seem more realistic to al-
low the jurors to consider their impressions coupled with the other evi-
dence presented under a charge that all evdence must be considered?
Further, if the view is to be solely for the purpose of allowing the jury
to better follow the evidence, certainly the judge, as in most other cases,
should have been empowered with the privilege of permitting such a
view when, in his discretion, it would be of benefit for this purpose.
Such wording would also have precluded the quandary existing today as
'Wright v. Carpenter, 49 Cal. 607 (1875); Close v. Samtu, 27 Iowa 503 (1869).
In the course of the dissenting opinion Judge Wright said at 511. "If the only ob-
ject of the statute was to enable the jury to better understand, and more intelligently
to apply, testimony of the witnesses, then I confess that I do not see why, upon
this basis alone, they might not, in determining the ultimate facts, 'include' or make
use of, this 'personal examination.' If they are to use it to enable them 'to under-
stand and apply the testimony,' then, it seems to me they are possessed of facts un-
known to the parties; and whether the impresssions received and the applications of
this testimony are true or false will no more be discovered than if they have actually
'burdened' themselves with testmony."
'Zanesville, Marietta and Parkersburg R.1L v. Bolen, 76 Ohlo St. 376, 81 N.E. 681
(1907).
0 See 1 THOMPSON ON TRIALS § 895 (2d ed. 1912) for a more complete discus-
sion of these views in relation to criminal and civil cases as well as appropriation
proceedings.
19581
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to whether the Ohio Supreme Court will uphold the "sixty day rule. '27
The courts could, as before, construe the "mandatory" view requirement
as effecting a stay of tide until view by the jury, but it seems doubtful
that the courts would so hold. The wording of the recent amendments
to the highway appropriation procedure28 show a clear intendment on
the part of the legislature to allow the property - even when there are
structures thereon - to be appropriated without delay, and rarely will
the court go against the apparent intention of the legislature. Ohio's
rulings on the purpose of the jury's view would not be a deterent factor
in reaching such a result.
IS THE JURY APPRAISAL SAnSFACTORY?
Is there a better method than the two sides choosing their appraisers
and trying to confuse the jury? The two thoughts as to value are gen-
erally antipodal with the property owner, having his price up in the
clouds, feeling that the state is down in the basement. Those who feel
that as a method the jury system is the best device for people with dif-
ferences of opinion to have such differences settled are going to be re-
quired to champion some procedural and professional changes to quell
the mounting dissatisfaction. Those who are opposed to the present
system have raised the cry- "Taking Appropriation cases to the jury
only adds to the already overcrowded docket." The delay in hearing
appropriation cases is not, however, caused by an overcrowded docket,
but rather is the result of professional dallying. The Ohio Revised
Code29 provides for the hearing to be set not more than twenty days after
the court has determined that an appeal has been properly perfected.
The hesitancy with which these cases are being tried can be attributed to
either of two causes. First, the counsel hasn't assembled all the infor-
mation required to try the case and passes, or, second, he is marshalling
his evidence by the delay. An example of this last situation might occur
when counsel feels that psychologically a more favorable case would be
presented by precluding the jury's view and offering the three apparisals
required by Section 5519.03 of the Ohio Revised Code. A speedier
handling of the cases could be accomplished by the judges requesting
the assignment commissioners to require counsel to hold the line and
not allow so many passes. Other factors to be considered which might
facilitate the procedure would be to dispense with the need for a special
refte,30 to add a circuit judge for the benefit of the metropolitan coun-
Om2io REV. CODE § 5519.03 (1957).
'OHio REV. CODE §§ 5519.01-.03 (1957).
2'§ 5519.02 (1957).
8' -no REV. CODE § 5519.02 (1957).
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ties engulfed in the docket backlog, and change the nature of appropria-
tion cases to more closely approximate a normal proceeding for damages.
The first step in this latter direction could be accomplished by the elim-
ination of the lengthy and complicated oath given to the jury31 -the
import of which only confuses the average layman serving; the result of
which could be accomplished by the charge.
IS THE JURY SYSTEM MANDATORY 1
Short of constitutional limitations the legislature is unfettered in en-
acting laws governing procedure to be followed in eminent domain ac-
tions. The organic law requires that no man be deprived of his prop-
erty without "due process" of law.32  Although the nebulous concept of
due process has been variously circumscribed by court decisions, all
courts agree that due process requires two major ingredients: some-
where during the proceedings there must be notice and an opportunity
to be heard. When an owner's property is taken from him for public
use by appropriation he is entitled, under the Constitution, to notice anC
an opportunity to be heard on the question of determining just compen-
sation.33 Unless the state constitution and statutes provide otherwise,3 1
he has no constitutional right to be heard on the validity of the taking,
which is a question of law for the court, or the necessity and expediency
of public unprovement, which is not a judicial question at all,35 except in
states in which it is specifically required.3 6 The constitutional right of
the owner to be protected against a taking without necessity are suf-
ficiently guarded by his right to institute proceedings at law or in equity
to save his property and have the taking set aside 37 The land owner,
Oino RE. CODE § 2709.16 (1953).
"U.S. CONsT. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
'North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276- (1925).
"Union School Dist v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys, 322 Mich. 165, 33 N.W.2d
807 (1948). The necessity for taking, as well as the value of the property, is de-
termined by the jury.
'North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925).
"Detroit v. Beecher, 75 Mich. 454, 42 N.W 986 (1889).
'Board of Water Comm'rs v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 84 Ad. 727 (1912); Grafton
v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry., 16 N.D. 313, 113 N.W 598 (1907);
State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 43 N.W 947 (1889). These actions
may test the validity of the grant of eminent domain to the body exercising the
power and whether the property condemned is to be put to a public use. There is a
distinction, however, between the necessity for using the power of eminent domain
and testing the necessity for taking the former is a political or legislative question,
while the latter is always a judicial question. The method was further clarified in
Wheeling & Lake Erie R.R. v. Toledo Ry. & Terminal Co., 72 Ohio St. 368, 74 N.E.
209 (1905), by the holding that when the court has jurisdiction to dismiss con-
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being constitutionally entitled to be heard on the amount of compensa-
tion or damages, must be given such notice as will give him an oppor-
tunity to be present at the hearing and present such evidence as he may
have as to value.38  Without such notice the taking is invalid3 9  Such
notice does not demand personal service - constructive notice by posting
or publication being sufficient 40
As for the ingredient of being heard, the seventh amendment to the
United States Constitution, which provides that in suits at common law
the right of trial shall be preserved where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, relates only to trials in the federal courts. Also,
no jury trial is required by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution in appropriation proceedings. 4' All that is required
is that the trial be conducted in some fair and just manner by an im-
partial tribunal. The nature and character of the tribunal, if providing
these requirements, are left to the discretion of the legislature.42
Ohio requires a jury trial in appropriation proceedings.43 This has
not always been the case. Under the provisions of the Ohio Constitution
of 1802 that "private property shall be held inviolate" it was held that
damages could be determined by three or more commissioners, without
intervention by the jury at any stage of the proceedings. 4 4  The Consti-
demnation proceedings on the ground of abuse of discretion, there is an adequate
remedy at law and an injunction will not be issured in a collateral proceeding.
' Morrison v. Indianapolis & Western Ry., 166 Ind. 511, 76 N.E. 961 (1906)
aft'd. 77 N.E. 744 (1906); Branson v. Gee, 25 Ore. 462, 36 Pac. 527 (1894)
The taking need not be preceded by notice so long as notice is given prior to the
hearing to assess damages.
'United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883). Compare State v. Jones, 139 N.C.
613, 52 S.E. 240 (1905) (The court inferred the requirement of nonce when the
statute did not specifically provide therefor.) w=th Sterrit v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146,
82 Pac. 946 (1905) (The statute held invalid because a specific provision for no-
tice was not included)
' Wuzzen v. San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 Pac. 353 (1894); Lancaster v. Augusta
Water Dist., 108 Me. 137, 79 At. 463 (1911) There is a duty on the non-resident
land owner to keep in touch with public affairs in the town where his real estate is
situated.
"Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brook-
lyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897)
'United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883). See State v. Jones, 139 N.C. 613,
52 SE. 240 (1905), where the court held an impartial tribunal is not secured if
the sole power of selection rests with one party, however, a statute providing that
each party shall choose an appraiser and that these two shall choose a third secures
an impartial tribunal.
'
3 O0iro CONST. art. I, § 19.
Hickox v. Cleveland, 8 Ohio 543 (1838). It was held that compensation was not
required to be first made, and that it might be taken for such use where provision
for the assessment and payment is made whether the owner was actually paid or not
it being sufficient if provision be made by law for compensating him; also that bene.
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tution makers of 1851 made a radical change in the procedure by re-
quiring, in section 19 of the Bill of Rights, "Assessment of compensation
by a jury."
Today, in other jurisdictions, eminent domain statutes frequently
provide that valuation of property taken by appropriation proceedings
be determined by referees or commissioners, instead of by a court and
jury, or a court alone. The legislative acts prescribing such procedure
must, of course, conform to the requirements of the state constitution.
Excellent examples can be found in statutes enacted under the New
York State Constitution 5 The necessity for condemnation and damages
are both assessed by a jury48 when an application for a private road47
has been made, but by a board of condemnation commissioners48 when
a town highway is involved.
The least onerous requirements are probably found in the Connecticut
Constitution49 under which the legislature enacted that "the determina-
tion of the amount of damages in any case brought by the state to con-
demn land or any interest therein shall be referred to a state referee."50
fits conferred might be set off against the value of the property so taken. Compen-
sation was determined by three commissioners who were sent out to view the prem-
ises. Under similar constitutional provisions the right of trial by jury is preserved
inviolate only as to the classes of cases in which the right was enjoyed before the
adoption of the Constitution. In all other cases the legislature may provide for a
hearing or trial without a jury. Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 78 S.W 770
(1904); Frost v. People, 193 IIL 635, 61 N.E. 1054 (1901).
"Art. I, § 7(b) (1938) "When private property shall be taken for public use,
the compensation made therefor, when such compensation not made by the state,
shall be ascertained by a jury, or by the Supreme Court without a jury, but not by a
referee other than an official referee, or by not less than three commissioners ap-
pointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law."
"N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 301.
'
7 Drake v. Rogers, 3 Hill. 604 (N.Y. CP. 1842). An order laying out a highway
"for" a single person, who is the only one benefited thereby, is a private, and not a
public, highway.
'N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 174: "Upon the presentation of such pennon (calling for
the town highway improvement), the county court must appoint three disinterested
freeholders, who shall not be named by any person interested in the proceedings, who
shall be residents of the county, but not of the town wherein the highway is located,
and who shall not be related by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree to
the applicant or to any person interested in the proceeding or to the owner of any
lands to be taken or affected by the laying out, alteration or discontinuance of a
highway as condemnation commissioners to determine the questions mentioned in
the last section. They shall personally examine the highway described in the
application, hear any reasons that may be offered for or against the laying out, alter-
ing or discontinuing of the highway, and assess all damages by reason thereof."
"Art. I, § 11. 'The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without
just compensation therefor."; art I, § 21. 'The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate."
rWCoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7178 (1949).
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CONCLUSION
The program for developing state and interstate highway systems is
picking up speed and there are "hotspots" resulting from legal friction.
The best lubrication may be procedural reforms. A glance at the index
of the Ohio Revised Code will reveal a dearth of statutory provisions per-
taining to eminent domain proceedings which makes one wonder if the
veritable mass of legislation in this area doesn't of itself breed confusion.
Standardization of procedure with possible division as to methods for the
public and private condemnor appears to be the ultimate in desirability.
The immediate "hotspot' as to what type tribunal shall determine
damages accruihg from appropriation and the corollary problem involv-
ing the role of the jury, have been spotlighted in Ohio by its highway
program. With an increase in work-load, efficiency of procedure be-
comes mandatory. Mr. Waddel met this challenge by his directive
calling for uniformity in negotiations. The legislature has aided effi-
ciency by apparently successfully disposing of the impediment of delayed
possession when buildings occupy the land by the "60 day rule," though
it is questioned whether the legislature should not have removed all
doubt.
Objectively, the view by the jury isn't too important and could effec-
tively be replaced by evidentiary aids such as photographs and maps
which, being constantly before the jury, would implement their following
the evidence far more than a cursory inspection accomplished without
leaving the bus when the snow prevents even a jaunt across the property
being appropriated. The jury in trying the facts must arrive at a value
for the damage to the property owner. Are they weighing the evidence
to arrive at a figure based on the truthfulness of the witness or their
opinion as to the value of the property? If the former, too much weight
is -being placed on the character of the witness rather than the character
of his testimony, and, if the latter, it is submitted that valuation of prop-
erty has become a highly complex and professional task - outside the
ken of the layman.
As a substitute for the jury in assessing value it is proposed we adopt
a system smacking of arbitration whereby the state appoints one man,
the property owner one man, and these two choose a third; these three
men arriving at a value based upon the expert testimony of architects,
engineers, contractors, investors and realtors together with their own
spectal knowledge of real estate values. By this method the Corduroy
Road to Ohio's Superhighways could be traversed more smoothly, un-
impeded by the vagaries of the jury wheel.
JACK L. RENNER
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